Conditional Equivalence Testing: an alternative remedy for publication
  bias by Campbell, Harlan & Gustafson, Paul
Conditional Equivalence Testing: an alternative remedy to publication bias
Conditional Equivalence Testing: an alternative
remedy for publication bias
Harlan Campbell harlan.campbell@stat.ubc.ca
Paul Gustafson gustaf@stat.ubc.ca
Department of Statistics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
October, 2017
Abstract
We introduce a publication policy that incorporates “conditional equivalence test-
ing” (CET), a two-stage testing scheme in which standard NHST is followed con-
ditionally by testing for equivalence. The idea of CET is carefully considered as it
has the potential to address recent concerns about reproducibility and the limited
publication of null results. In this paper we detail the implementation of CET,
investigate similarities with a Bayesian testing scheme, and outline the basis for
how a scientific journal could proceed to reduce publication bias while remaining
relevant.
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1. Introduction
Poor reliability, within many scientific fields, is a major concern for researchers, sci-
entific journals and the public at large. In a highly cited essay, Ioannidis (2005) uses
Bayes theorem to claim that more than half of published research findings are false.
While not all agree with the extent of this conclusion, the argument raises concerns
about the trustworthiness of science, amplified by a disturbing prevalence of scien-
tific misconduct, Fanelli (2009). That the reliability of a result may be substantially
c© H. Campbell and P. Gustafson.
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lower than its p-value suggests has been “underappreciated” (Goodman & Greenland,
2007), to say the least.
To address this problem, some journal editors have taken radical measures (e.g.
Trafimow & Marks (2015)), while the reputation of researchers and the credibility of
the science they generate are tarnished (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). The foundational
premise of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) is now in question1 (Lash, 2017;
Hofmann, 2016; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2016; Cumming, 2014), and the usefulness of the
p-value vigorously debated (Lew, 2013; Chavalarias et al., 2016; Gelman, 2013a).
The limited publication of null results is certainly one of the most substantial
factors contributing to low reliability. Whether due to a reluctance of journals to
publish null results or to a reluctance of investigators to submit their null research
(Dickersin et al., 1992; Reysen, 2006), the consequence is severe publication bias; see
Franco et al. (2014) and Doshi et al. (2013). Despite repeated warnings, publication
bias persists and, to a certain degree, this is understandable. Accepting a null result
can be difficult, owing to the well-known fact that “absence of evidence is not evidence
of absence” (Hartung et al., 1983; Altman & Bland, 1995). As Greenwald (1975)
writes: “it is inadvisable to place confidence in results that support a null hypothesis
because there are too many ways (including incompetence of the researcher), other
than the null hypothesis being true, for obtaining a null result.” Indeed, this is the
foremost critique of NHST, that it cannot provide evidence in favour of the null
hypothesis. The commonly held belief that for non-significant result to show high
“retrospective power” (Zumbo & Hubley, 1998) implies support in favour of the null,
is problematic; see Hoenig & Heisey (2001). In fact, a larger p-value (e.g. p-value
> 0.05), combined with high power often occurs even in situations when the data
support the alternative hypothesis more than the null, Greenland (2012).
In order to address publication bias, it is often suggested (Walster & Cleary, 1970;
Sterling et al., 1995; Dwan et al., 2008; Suñé et al., 2013) that publication decisions
should be made without regards to the statistical significance of results, i.e. “result-
blind peer review” (Greve et al., 2013). In fact, a growing number of psychology
and neuroscience journals are adopting pre-registration (Nosek et al., 2017) including
“Registered Reports” (RR) (Chambers et al., 2015), a publication policy in which
authors “pre-register their hypotheses and planned analyses before the collection of
1 To be clear, NHST has long been controversial (Nickerson, 2000; Harlow et al., 2016) but this
controversy has recently been renewed.
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data” (Chambers et al., 2014). If the rationale and methods are sound, the RR journal
agrees (before any data are collected) to publish the study regardless of the eventual
data and outcome obtained. Among many potential pitfalls with result-blind peer
review (Findley et al., 2016), a legitimate and substantial concern is that, if a journal
were to adopt such a policy, it might quickly become a “dumping ground” (Greve et al.,
2013) for null and ambiguous findings that do little to contribute to the advancement
of science. To address these concerns, RR journals require that, for any manuscript
to be accepted, authors must provide a-priori (before any data are collected) sample
size calculations that show statistical power of at least 90% (in some cases 80%). This
is a reasonable remedy to a difficult problem. Still, it is problematic for two reasons.
First, it is acknowledged that this policy will disadvantage researchers who work
with “expensive techniques or who have limited resources” (Chambers et al., 2014).
While not ideal, small studies can provide definitive value and potential for learning;
see Sackett & Cook (1993). For this reason, some go as far as arguing against any
requirement for a-priori sample size calculations (i.e. needing to show sufficient power
as a requisite for publication). For example, Bacchetti (2002) writes: “If a study finds
important information by blind luck instead of good planning, I still want to know
the results”; see also Aycaguer & Galbán (2013). While unfortunate, the loss of
potentially valuable “blind luck” results and small sample studies (Matthews, 1995)
appears to be a necessary price to pay for keeping a “result-blind peer review” journal
relevant. Is this too high a price? Based on simulations, Borm et al. (2009) conclude
that the negative impact of publication bias does not warrant the exclusion of studies
with low power.
Second, a-priori power calculations are often flawed, due to the unfortunate “sam-
ple size samba” (Schulz & Grimes, 2005): the practice of retrofitting the anticipated
effect size in order to obtain a desirable sample size. Even under ideal circumstances,
a-priori power estimation is often “wildly optimistic” (Bland, 2009) and heavily bi-
ased due to the “illusion of power” (Vasishth & Gelman, 2017). This “illusion” occurs
when the estimated effect size is based on a literature filled with overestimates (to be
expected in many fields due, somewhat ironically, to publication bias). Djulbegovic
et al. (2011) conduct a retrospective analysis of phase III randomized controlled tri-
als (RCTs) and conclude that optimism bias significantly contributes to inconclusive
results; see also Chalmers & Matthews (2006). What’s more, oftentimes due to unan-
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ticipated difficulties with enrolment, the actual sample size achieved is substantially
lower than the target set out a-priori, Chan et al. (2008). In these situations, RR re-
quires that either the study is rejected/withdrawn for publication or a certain leeway
is given under special circumstances (Chambers (2017), personal communication).
Neither option is ideal. Given these difficulties with a-priori power calculations, it
remains to be seen to what extent the 90% power requirement will reduce the num-
ber of underpowered publications that could lead a journal to be a dreaded “dumping
ground”.
An alternative proposal to address publication bias and the related issues sur-
rounding low reliability is for researchers to adopt Bayesian testing schemes; e.g.
Dienes & Mclatchie (2017), Kruschke & Liddell (2017) and Wagenmakers (2007). It
has been suggested that with Bayesian methods, publication bias will be mitigated
“because the evidence can be measured to be just as strong either way” (Dienes,
2016). Bayesian methods may also provide for a better understanding of the strength
of evidence (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). However, researchers in many fields re-
main uncomfortable with the need to define (subjective) priors and are concerned
that Bayesian methods may increase “researcher degrees of freedom” (Simmons et
al., 2011). Furthermore, it is acknowledged that sample sizes will typically need to
be larger than with equivalent frequentist testing in situations when there is little
prior information incorporated, Zhang et al. (2011). Nevertheless, a number of RR
journals allow for a Bayesian option. At registration (before any data are collected),
rather than committing to a specific sample size, researchers commit to attaining a
certain Bayes Factor (BF). For example, the journals Comprehensive Results in Social
Psychology (CRSP) and NFS Journal (the official journal of the Society of Nutrition
and Food Science) require that one pledges to collect data until the BF is more than
3 (or less than 0.33), Jonas & Cesario (2017). The journals BMC Biology and the
Journal of Cognition require, as a requisite for publication, a BF of at least 6 (or less
than 1/6)2.
In this paper, we propose an alternate option made possible by adapting NHST
to conditionally incorporate equivalence testing. While equivalence testing is by no
means a novel idea, previous attempts to introduce equivalence testing have “largely
failed” (Lakens, 2017). Our proposal to systematically incorporate equivalence testing
2See editorial policies at: https://bmcbiol.biomedcentral.com/about/registered-reports, and
https://www.journalofcognition.org/about/registered-reports/
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into a two-stage testing procedure has not been extensively pursued (one exception
may be Hauck & Anderson (1986)) and there has not been any discussion of how
such a testing procedure could facilitate publication decisions for peer-review jour-
nals. One reason for this is a poor understanding of the conditional equivalence testing
strategy whereby testing traditional non-equivalence (or superiority) is followed con-
ditionally, by testing equivalence (or non-inferiority). In fact, whether or not such a
two-stage approach is beneficial has been somewhat controversial. As the sample-size
is typically determined based only on the primary test, the power of the secondary
equivalence (non-inferiority) test is not controlled, thereby potentially increasing the
false discovery rate, Ng (2003). Koyama & Westfall (2005) investigate and conclude
that, in most situations, such concern is unwarranted. In Section 2, in order to further
the understanding of conditional equivalence testing, we provide a brief overview in-
cluding how to carry out power calculations and how to (not necessarily prior to the
study) establish appropriate equivalence margins.
One reason conditional equivalence testing (CET) is an appealing approach is that
it shares many of the properties that make Bayesian testing schemes so attractive. As
such, the publication policy we put forward is somewhat similar to the RR “Bayesian
option”. With conditional equivalence testing, evidence can be measured in favour
of both the alternative and the null (at least in a pragmatic sense), and as such
is “compatible with a Bayesian point of view” (Ocaña i Rebull et al., 2008). In
Section 3, we conduct a simple simulation study to demonstrate how one will often
arrive at the same conclusion whether using CET or a Bayesian testing scheme.
In Section 4, we outline how a publication policy could be framed around CET to
encourage the publication of null results and make recommendations for reporting and
implementation. Finally, Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.
2. Conditional Equivalence Testing Overview
Standard equivalence testing is essentially NHST with the hypotheses reversed. For
example, for a two-sample study of means, the equivalence testing null hypothesis
would be a difference in means, and the alternative hypothesis would be equal (within
a given margin) means. Conditional equivalence testing (CET) is the practice of
standard NHST followed conditionally (if one fails to reject the null) by equivalence
testing. CET is not an altogether new way of testing. Rather it is the usage of
5
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established testing methods in a way that permits better interpretation of results.
In this regard, it is similar to other proposals such as the “three-way testing” scheme
proposed by Goeman et al. (2010), and Zhao (2016)’s proposal for incorporating both
statistical and clinical significance into one’s testing. To illustrate, what follows is a
brief outline of CET for a two-sample test of equal means (assuming equal variance).
Let xi1, for i = 1, ..., n1 and xi2, for i = 1, ..., n2 be independent random sam-
ples from two normally distributed populations of interest with µ1, the true mean
of population 1; µ2, the true mean of population 2; and σ2, the true common pop-
ulation variance. Let n = n1 + n2 and define sample means and sample variances
as follows: x¯g =
∑ng
i=1 xgi, and s2g =
∑ng
i=1(xgi − x¯g)2/(ng − 1), for g = 1, 2. Also,
let sp =
√
((n1 − 1)s21 + (n2 − 1)s22)/(n1 + n2 − 2). The true difference in population
means, µd = µ1−µ2, under the standard null hypothesis, H0, is equal to zero. Under
the standard alternative, H1, we have that µd 6= 0.
The term equivalence is not used in the strict sense that µ1 = µ2. Instead,
equivalence in this context refers to the notion that the two means are “close enough”,
i.e. their difference is within the equivalence margin, δ = [−∆,∆], chosen to define a
range of values considered equivalent (i.e. the “zone of indifference”). In equivalence
(and non-inferiority) trials, the ∆ is ideally chosen to be the “minimum clinically
meaningful difference” (Kaul & Diamond, 2006; Greene et al., 2008).
Let FTdf () be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the t distribution with
df degrees of freedom and define the following critical t values: t∗α1/2 = F
−1
Tn−2(1−0.5α1)
(i.e. the upper 100·α1
2
-th percentile of the t-distribution with n−2 degrees of freedom)
and t∗α2 = F
−1
Tn−2(1−α2), (i.e. the upper 100·α2-th percentile of the t-distribution with
n − 2 degrees of freedom). As such, α1 is the maximum allowable type I error (e.g.
α1=0.05) and α2 is the maximum allowable “type E” error (erroneously concluding
equivalence), possibly equal to α1. If a type E error is deemed less costly than a
type I error, α2 may be set higher (e.g. α2=0.10). CET is the following conditional
procedure consisting of five steps:
2.1
Step 1- A two-sided, two-sample t-test for a difference of means.
Calculate the t-statistic, T = (x¯1 − x¯2)/(sp
√
1/n1 + 1/n2) and associated
p-value, p1 = 2 · FTn−2(−|T |).
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Step 2- If |T | > t∗α1/2, then declare a positive result. There is evidence of
a statistically significant difference, p-value = p1.
Otherwise, if |T | ≤ t∗α1/2, proceed to Step 3.
Step 3- Two one-sided tests (TOST) for equivalence of means.
Calculate two t-statistics: T1 = (x¯1 − x¯2 + ∆)/(sp
√
1/n1 + 1/n2), and
T2 = (x¯1 − x¯2 − ∆)/(sp
√
1/n1 + 1/n2). Calculate an associated p-value,
p2 = max(FTn−2(−T1), FTn−2(T2)). Note: p2 is a marginal p-value, in that
it is not calculated under the assumption that p1 > α1.
Step 4- If T1 > t∗α2 and T2 < (−t∗α2), declare a negative result. There is
evidence of a statistically significant equivalence (δ = [−∆,∆]), p-value = p2.
Otherwise, proceed to Step 5.
Step 5- Declare an inconclusive result. There is insufficient evidence to
support any conclusion.
For ease of explanation, let us define pCET = p1 if the result is positive, and pCET =
1− p2 if the result is negative or inconclusive. Thus, a small value of pCET suggests
evidence in favour of a positive result, whereas a large value of pCET suggests evidence
in favour of a negative result. As is noted above, it is important to acknowledge that,
despite the above procedure being dubbed “conditional”, p2 is a marginal p-value, i.e.
it is not calculated under the assumption that p1 > α1. The interpretation of p2
would be the same regardless of whether it was obtained following Steps 1 and 2 or
was obtained “on its own” via standard equivalence testing.
Standard NHST involves the same first and second steps and ends with an alter-
native Step 3 which states that if p1>α1, one declares an inconclusive result (‘there is
insufficient evidence to reject the null.’). Similar to two-sided CET, one-sided CET is
straightforward, making use of non-inferiority testing in Step 3. Note that one-sided
CET testing, like all one-sided testing, is vulnerable to potential post-hoc abuse, i.e.
the direction of the test could be based on the data (Freedman, 2008).
There is a large literature on Step 3’s TOST and non-inferiority testing, see Walker
& Nowacki (2011) and Meyners (2012) for overviews that cover the basics as well as
more subtle issues. There are also many proposed alternatives to TOST for equiv-
alence testing, what are known as “the emperor’s new tests” (Perlman et al., 1999).
These alternative are offered as marginally more powerful options, yet are more com-
plex and are not widely used. As such, we will not go into any further detail and
refer those interested to Meyners (2012).
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CET is a procedure applicable to any type of outcome. Let θ be the parameter
of interest in a more general testing setting. CET can be described in terms of
calculating confidence intervals around θˆ, the statistic of interest. For example, θ
may be defined as the the difference in sample proportions, the hazard ratio, the
risk ratio, or the slope of a linear regression model, etc. For details on equivalence
testing in more general scenarios (i.e. non-continuously distributed outcomes, one-
sample and two-sample tests), see Chen et al. (2000) (equivalence testing for two
proportions), da Silva et al. (2009) (binary and survival outcomes), Wiens & Iglewicz
(2000) (three treatment arms), Wellek (2010) (binary outcomes, count outcomes and
more), Dixon & Pechmann (2005) (linear trends), Dannenberg et al. (1994) (data
with unequal variances), and Hauschke et al. (1990) (nonparametric tests). Note
that in these other cases, the equivalence margin, δ, may not necessarily be centred
at zero, but will be a symmetric interval around θ0, the value of θ under the standard
null hypothesis. In general, let δ = [δL, δU ], with ∆ equal to half the length of the
interval. Consider, more generally, CET as the following procedure:
2.2
Step 1- Calculate a (1− α1)% Confidence Interval for θ.
Step 2- If this C.I. excludes θ0, then declare a positive result.
Otherwise, if θ0 is within the C.I., proceed to Step 3.
Step 3- Calculate a (1− 2α2)% Confidence Interval for θ.
Step 4- If this C.I. is entirely within δ, declare a negative result.
Otherwise, proceed to Step 5.
Step 5- Declare an inconclusive result.
There is insufficient evidence to support any conclusion.
Figure 1 illustrates the three conclusions with their associated confidence intervals.
In this figure, we once again consider two-sample testing of normally distributed data
as described for box 2.1., with α1 = 0.05 and α2 = 0.10. Situation “a”, in which
the (1 − α1)% C.I. is entirely outside the equivalence margin is what Guyatt et al.
(1995) calls a “definitive-positive” result. The lower confidence limit of the parameter
is not only larger than zero (the null value, θ0), implying a “positive” result, but
also is above the ∆ threshold. Situations “b” and “c”, in which the (1 − α1)% C.I.
excludes zero and the (1 − 2α2)% C.I. is within [−∆,∆] are considered “positive”
8
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Conditional Equivalence Testing
Point estimates, (1-α1)% confidence intervals, and (1-2α2)% confidence intervals
Positive
Negative
Inconclusive
Figure 1: Point estimates and confidence intervals of thirteen possible results from two-sample
testing of normally distributed data (as in box 2.1) are presented alongside their cor-
responding conclusions. Here θ0 = 0 and 2α2 > α1. Black points indicate point esti-
mates; blue lines (wider intervals) represent (1-α1)% confidence intervals; and orange
lines (shorter intervals) represent (1-2α2)% confidence intervals.
results but require some additional interpretation. One could describe the effect in
these cases as “significant yet not meaningful” or conclude that there is evidence of
a significant effect, yet the effect is likely “not minimally important”. A “positive”
result such as “d”, with a wider confidence interval, represents a significant, albeit
9
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imprecisely estimated, effect. One could conclude that additional studies, with larger
sample sizes, are required to determine if the effect is of a meaningful magnitude.
Evidently, in some cases, the three categories are not sufficient on their own for
adequate interpretation. For example, without any additional information the “pos-
itive” vs. “negative” distinction between cases “b” and “f” is misleading. These two
results appear very similar: in both cases a substantial (i.e. greater than ∆-sized)
effect can be ruled out. Indeed, positive result “b” appears much more like the neg-
ative result “f” than positive result “a”. Additional language and careful attention to
the estimated effect size is required for correct interpretation. While case “k” has a
similar point estimate to “b” and “f”, the wider C.I. (∆ is within (1 − 2α2)% C.I.)
means that one cannot rule out the possibility of a meaningful effect, and so it is
rightly categorized as “inconclusive”.
It may be argued that CET is simply a recalibration of the standard confidence
interval, like converting Fahrenheit to Celsius. This is valid commentary and in
response, it should be noted that our suggestion to adopt CET (in the place of
standard confidence intervals) is not unlike that of Gardner & Altman (1986) who
suggest that confidence intervals should replace p-values; see also Cumming (2008)
and Reichardt & Gollob (2016). One advantage of CET over confidence intervals is
that it may improve the interpretation of null results, see Parkhurst (2001) and Hauck
& Anderson (1986). By clearly distinguishing between what is a negative versus an
inconclusive result, CET serves to simplify the long “series of searching questions”
necessary to evaluate a “failed outcome” (Pocock & Stone, 2016). However, as can be
seen with the examples of Figure 1, the use of CET should not rule the complementary
use of confidence intervals. Indeed, the best interpretation of a result will be when
using both tools together.
As Dienes & Mclatchie (2017) clearly explain, with standard NHST, one is unable
to make the “three-way distinction” between the positive, inconclusive and negative
(“evidence for H1”, “no evidence to speak of”, and “evidence for H0”). Figure 2 shows
the distribution of standard two-tailed p-values under NHST and corresponding pCET
values under CET for three different sample sizes. These are the result of two-sample
testing of normally distributed data as described for box 2.1, with n1 = n2.
Under the standard null (µd = 0) with NHST, one is just as likely to obtain a
large p-value as one is to obtain a small p-value. Under the standard null with CET,
10
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Figure 2: Distribution of two-tailed p-values from NHST and pCET values from CET, with varying
n (total sample size) and δ = [−0.5, 0.5]. Data are the results from 10,000 Monte Carlo
simulations of two-sample normally distributed data with equal variance, σ2 = 1. The
true difference in means, µd = µ1 − µ2, is drawn from a uniform distribution between
-2 and 2. Black points (= 1 − p2) indicate evidence in favour of equivalence (“nega-
tive result”), whereas blue points (= p1) indicate evidence in favour of non-equivalence
(“positive result”). An “inconclusive result” would occur for all black points falling in
between the two dashed horizontal lines at α1 = 0.05 and α2 = 0.10, (i.e for p2 > α2).
The format of this plot is based on Figure 1, “Distribution of two-tailed P-values from
Student’s t-test”, from Lew (2013).
a small p2 value (a large pCET value) will indicate evidence in favour of equivalence
given sufficient data. In Figure 2, note that the blue points that fall below the
α1 = 0.05 threshold in the upper panels (NHST) remain unchanged in the lower
panels (CET). However, blue points that fall above the α1 = 0.05 threshold in the
upper panels (NHST) are no longer present in the lower panels (CET). They have been
replaced by black points (= pCET = 1−p2) which, if near the top, suggest evidence in
favour of equivalence. This treatment of the larger p-values is more conducive to the
interpretation of null results bringing to mind the thoughts of Amrhein et al. (2017)
who write “[a]s long as we treat our larger p-values as unwanted children, they will
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continue disappearing in our file drawers, causing publication bias, which has been
identified as the possibly most prevalent threat to reliability and replicability.”
2.1 Defining the equivalence margin
As with standard equivalence and non-inferiority testing, defining the equivalence
margin will be one of the “most difficult issues” for CET (Hung et al., 2005). If the
margin is too large, then a claim of equivalence is meaningless. If the margin is too
small, then the probability of declaring equivalence, will be substantially reduced;
see Wiens (2002). As stated earlier, the margin is ideally chosen as a boundary to
exclude ‘minimum clinically meaningful differences’ (Kaul & Diamond, 2006; Greene
et al., 2008). However, “clinically meaningful” effects are difficult to define, and there
is generally no clear consensus among stakeholders, Keefe et al. (2013). Furthermore,
previously agreed-upon meaningful differences may be difficult to ascertain as they
are rarely specified in protocols and published results (Djulbegovic et al., 2011).
In some fields, there are some generally accepted norms. For example, in bioavail-
ability studies, equivalence is routinely defined (and listed by regulatory authorities)
as a difference of less than 20%. In oncology trials, a small effect size has been de-
fined as odds ratio or hazard ratio of 1.3 or less, Bedard et al. (2007). In ecology, a
proposed equivalence region for trends in population size (the log-linear population
regression slope) is δ = [−0.0346, 0.0346], Dixon & Pechmann (2005).
In cases when a specified equivalence margin may not be as clear-cut, less conven-
tional options have been put forth. Hauck & Anderson (1986) propose the concept
of using an “equivalence curve” that illustrates results for a range of possibilities.
Meyners (2007) proposes to use the least equivalent allowable difference (LEAD), the
largest possible value of ∆ for which one can claim equivalence. The public would
then be left to draw their own conclusions from the data and whether they believe
the LEAD-∆ is a reasonable standard for equivalence. This would no doubt lead
to a discussion about which effect sizes are too small to be worthwhile for a given
treatment, and advance researchers towards a specific standard.
One important choice a researcher must make in defining the equivalence margin is
whether the margin should be defined on a raw or standardized scale. Lakens (2017)
discusses the pros and cons of each option. For example, if there is no rationale for any
standard margin in our two-sample normal case, taking equivalence to be a difference
12
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within half the estimated standard deviation, i.e. defining ∆ = qsp, with pre-specified
q=0.5 seems reasonable. Note, that the probability of obtaining a negative result may
be zero (or negligible) for certain combinations of values of α1, α2, n1, n2 and q. For
example, with q = 0.5, α1 = 0.05, and α2 = 0.10, Pr(negative) = 0 for all n ≤ 26
(with n1 = n2). As such, q must be chosen with additional practical considerations
(see additional details in 2.2). For binary and time-to-event outcomes, there is an
even greater number of different ways one can define the margin (e.g. in terms of
relative risk vs. odds ratio). For discussions on this, see Ng (2008), da Silva et al.
(2009), Tsou et al. (2007) and Barker et al. (2001).
It is important to note that, while it may be ideal to specify the margin prior
to collecting data, setting the margin afterwards will not lead to any type I error
inflation (i.e. one will not erroneously reject H0 : θ = θ0 with probability greater
than α1). For the same reason that a 95% C.I. is just as valid as a 85% C.I., but must
be interpreted differently, CET is valid regardless of whether the margin is specified
(on a raw, or a standardized scale by defining q) before or after data are obtained.
However, the conclusion made will clearly depend upon the margin chosen, and for
any non-positive result, it is always be possible to choose a specific margin (or specific
value for q) which leads to a negative conclusion (see Figure 1). Since the choice of
margin is often a difficult one in the best of circumstances, a retrospective choice is
not ideal as there will be ample room for bias in one’s choice, regardless of how well
intentioned one may be. For this reason, for equivalence and non-inferiority RCTs, it
is generally expected that margins are to be pre-specified (Piaggio et al., 2006).
2.2 Operating characteristics and sample size calculations
What follows is a brief overview of how to calculate the probabilities of obtaining
each of the three conclusions (positive, negative, and inconclusive) as listed in our
CET procedure above for two-sample testing of normal data with equal variance (box
2.1). More in-depth related work includes Shieh (2016) who establishes exact power
calculations for TOST for equivalence of normally distributed data and da Silva et
al. (2009) who review power and sample size calculations for equivalence testing of
binary and time-to-event outcomes.
As before, let the true population mean difference be µd = µ1−µ2 and the true pop-
ulation variance equal σ2. Let σ∗ = σ
√
(1/n1 + 1/n2) and s∗ = sp
√
(1/n1 + 1/n2).
13
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Figure 3 illustrates how each of the three conclusions can be reached based on the
values of s∗ and µˆd = x¯1 − x¯2 obtained from the data. For this plot, n = 90 (with
n1 = n2), ∆ = 0.5, α1 = 0.05 and α2 = 0.10. The black lettered points correspond
to the scenarios of Figure 1. The interior diamond, ♦, (with corners located at [0,0],
[−∆/(t∗α2/t∗α1/2 + 1),∆/(t∗α1/2 + t∗α2)], [0,∆/t∗α2 ], [∆/(t∗α2/t∗α1/2 + 1),∆/(t1 + t2)]) covers
the values for which a negative conclusion is obtained. A positive conclusion cor-
responds to when |x¯1 − x¯2| is large and s∗ is relatively small. Note how ∆ and σ
impact the conclusion. If the equivalence margin is sufficiently wide, one will have
Pr(inconclusive) approach zero as σ approaches zero. Indeed, the ratio of ∆/σ de-
termines, to a large extent, the probability of a negative result. If the equivalence
margin is sufficiently narrow and the variance relatively large (i.e. ∆/σ is very small),
one will have Pr(negative) ≈ 0.
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Figure 3: Let n = 90, ∆ = 0.5, t1 = t∗α1/2, t2 = t
∗
α2 . The values of µˆd = x¯1− x¯2 (on the x-axis) and
s∗ (on the y-axis) are obtained from the data. The three conclusions, positive, negative,
inconclusive correspond to the three areas shaded in green, blue and red respectively.
The black lettered points correspond to the scenarios of Figure 1.
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Let us assume for simplicity that n1 = n2. Then, the sampling distributions
of the sample mean and sample variance are well established: µˆd ∼ N(µd, σ∗2) and
(n−2)s2p
σ2
∼ χ2n−2. Therefore, given fixed values for µ and σ2, we can calculate the
probability of obtaining a positive result, Pr(positive). In Figure 3, Pr(positive)
equals the probability of µˆd and s∗ falling into either the left or right “positive”
corners and is calculated (as in a usual power calculation for NHST):
Pr(positive;µd, σ) =
(
1− Fn−2,µd
σ∗
(
t∗α1/2
))
+ Fn−2,µd
σ∗
(
− t∗α1/2
)
(1)
where Fdf,ncp(x) is the cdf of the non-central t distribution with df degrees of freedom
and non-centrality parameter ncp.
One can calculate the probability of obtaining a negative result, Pr(negative),
as the probability of µˆd and s∗ falling into the “negative” diamond, ♦. Since µˆd
and s∗ are independent statistics, we can write their joint density as the product
of a normal probability density function, fN(), and a chi-squared probability density
function, fχ2(). However, the resulting double integral will remain difficult to evaluate
algebraically over the boundary, ♦. Therefore, the probability is best approximated
numerically, for example, by Monte Carlo integration, as follows:
Pr(negative;µd, σ) =
∫ ∫
♦
fN(u;µd, σ
∗2)fχ2(v;n− 2)dudv
=
∫
♦
(
Φ(h2(v);µd, σ
∗)− Φ(h1(v);µd, σ∗)
)
fχ2(v;n− 2)dv
≈
M∑
j=1
(
Φ(h2(cj);µd, σ
∗)− Φ(h1(cj);µd, σ∗)
)
/M
where Φ() is the normal cdf and Monte Carlo draws from a chi-squared distribution
provide cj =
√
σ2q[j]/(n− 2), with q[j] ∼ χ2n−2 for j = 1, ...,M . The left and right-
hand boundaries of the diamond-shaped “negative region”, are defined by h1(cj) =
min(0,max(+cjt2 −∆,−cjt1)) and h2(cj) = max(0,min(−cjt2 + ∆,+cjt1)).
Defining the boundary with h1() and h2() allows for three distinct cases as seen
in Figure 3:
(1) s∗ > ∆/t∗α2 , in which case h1(s
∗) = h2(s∗) = 0;
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(2) ∆/(t∗α1/2 + t
∗
α2
) < s∗ < ∆/t∗α2 , in which case h1(s
∗) = −∆ + t∗α2s∗ and h2(s∗) =
∆− t∗α2s∗; and
(3) s∗ < ∆/(t∗α1/2 + t
∗
α2
), in which case h1(s∗) = −t∗α1/2s∗ and h2(s∗) = +t∗α1/2s∗.
When the equivalence boundaries are defined as a function of sp (e.g. ∆ = qsp),
the calculations are somewhat different; Figure 4 illustrates. In particular, a negative
conclusion requires: qs∗/
√
1/n1 + 1/n2 > |µˆd±s∗t∗α2| (i.e. the (1 − 2α2)% C.I. is
entirely within [−∆,∆]). As such, for a given sample size, it will only be possible to
obtain a negative result if q > t∗α2
√
1/n1 + 1/n2. Likewise, an inconclusive result will
only be possible if (q/
√
1/n1 + 1/n2) < (t
∗
α1/2
+ t∗α2).
negative
inconclusiveinconclusive
positive positive
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
−0.5 0 0.5
x1 − x2
S
*
Figure 4: Let n = 90, ∆ = 0.5sp, α1 = 0.05 and α2 = 0.10. The three conclusions, positive,
negative, inconclusive correspond to the three areas shaded in green, blue and red re-
spectively.
In order to determine an appropriate sample size for CET, one must replace µd
with an a-priori estimate, µ˜d, the “anticipated effect size”, and replace σ2 with an
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a-priori estimate, σ˜2, the “anticipated variance”. Then one might be interested in
calculating six values: the probabilities of obtaining each of the three possible results
(positive, negative and inconclusive) under two hypothetical scenarios, (1) where
µd = 0, and (2) where µd equal to µ˜d, the value expected given results in the literature.
One might also be interested in a hybrid approach whereby one specifies a composite
null and alternative distribution. Since the objective of any study should be to obtain
a conclusive result, sample size could also be calculated with the objective to maximize
the likelihood of success, i.e. to minimize Pr(inconclusive).
Required sample size for 90% Power, or Pr(Success)=61%
µd
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Variance,  σ2
0.75, Power
1.00, Power
1.25, Power
0.75, Pr(Success)
1.00, Pr(Success)
1.25, Pr(Success)
a1
a2
b1
b2
Figure 5: Suppose the anticipated effect size is µ˜d = 0.205, the anticipated variance is σ˜2 = 1
and the equivalence margin is pre-specified with ∆ = 0.1025 (= 12 µ˜d). Then, based on
the desire for Pr(positive) = 90% (i.e. “power” = 0.90) (dashed blue lines) or a 61%
“probability of success” (solid red lines) a sample size of n = 1, 000 (with n1 = n2) would
be required. If the true variance is slightly larger than anticipated, σ2 = 1.25, and the
effect size smaller, µd = 0.123, the actual sample size needed for 90% power is in fact
3,476, while the actual sample size needed for Pr(success) = 61% is 1,770; see points
“a1” and “a2”. On the other hand, if the true variance is slightly smaller than anticipated,
σ2 = 0.75 and the effect size greater, µd = 0.33, the actual sample size needed for 90%
power is only 288, while the actual sample size needed for Pr(success|δ, d, s) = 61% is
638; see points “b1” and “b2”.
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The quantity:
Pr(success) = 1− 1
2
Pr(inconclusive;µd = µ˜d, σ˜
2)− 1
2
Pr(inconclusive;µd = 0, σ˜
2)
(2)
represents the probability of a “successful” study under the assumption that the null
(µd = 0) and alternative (with specified µd = µ˜d) are equally likely. (Note that both
false positive-, and false negative- studies in this equation are considered “successful”.)
This weighted average could be considered a simple version of what is known as
“assurance” (O’Hagan et al., 2005). Figure 5 shows how consideration of Pr(success)
as the criteria for determining sample size attenuates the effect of µ˜d on the required
sample size. Suppose one calculates that the required sample size is n = 1, 000 based
on the desire for 90% statistical power and the belief that σ˜2= 1 and µd=0.205, with
n1 = n2 as before. This corresponds to a 61% probability of success for ∆=0.1025
(=1
2
µd). If the true variance is slightly larger than anticipated, σ2=1.25, and the
difference in means smaller, µd=0.123, the actual sample size needed for 90% power
is in fact n=3,476, while the actual sample size needed for Pr(success|∆, d, s) =
61% is n=1,770. On the other hand, if the true variance is slightly smaller than
anticipated, σ2 = 0.75 and the difference in means greater, µd=0.33, the actual sample
size needed for 90% power is only n=288, while the actual sample size needed for
Pr(success|δ, d, s)=61% is n=638. It follows that, if one has little certainty in µd
and σ2, calculating the required sample size with consideration of Pr(success) may
be less risky.
For related work on statistical power, see Shao et al. (2008) who propose a hybrid
Bayesian-frequentist approach to evaluate power for testing both superiority and non-
inferiority. Jia & Lynn (2015) discuss a related sample size planning approach that
considers both statistical significance and clinical significance. Finally, Jiroutek et
al. (2003) advocate that, rather than calculate statistical power (the probability of
rejecting θ = θ0 should the alternative be true), one should calculate the probability
that the width of a confidence interval is less than a fixed constant and the null
hypothesis is rejected, given that the confidence interval contains the true parameter.
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3. A comparison with Bayesian testing
Recently, Bayesian statistics have been advocated for, as a “possible solution to pub-
lication bias” (Konijn et al., 2015). In particular, there have been many Bayesian
testing schemes proposed in the psychology literature; see the discussion of Mulder
& Wagenmakers (2016) and, for an accessible overview of the “Bayesian t-test”, see
Gönen (2010). What’s more, publication policies based on Bayesian testing schemes
are currently in use by a small number of journals and are the preferred approach for
some (e.g. Dienes & Mclatchie (2017)). In response to these developments, we will
compare, with regards to their operating characteristics, CET and a Bayesian testing
scheme. This brings to mind Dienes (2014) who compares testing with Bayes Factors
(BF) to testing with “interval methods” and notes that with interval methods, a study
result is a “reflection of the data”, whereas with BFs the result reflects the “evidence
of one theory over another”. What follows is a brief overview of one Bayesian scheme
and an investigation of how it compares to CET.
The Bayes Factor is a valuable tool for determining the degree of evidence for
the absence of a treatment effect, see most recently Hoekstra et al. (2017). Consider,
for the two-sample testing of normally distributed data (as described for box 2.1), a
Bayes Factor testing scheme in which we take the JZS (Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow) prior for
the alternative hypothesis, see Rouder et al. (2009). Note that, for the Bayes Factor,
the null hypothesis, H0, corresponds to µd = 0; and the alternative, H1, corresponds
to µd 6= 0.
The JZS testing scheme involves placing a normal prior on η = (µ2 − µ1)/σ,
η ∼ Normal(0, σ2η), and for the hyper-parameter ση, placing an inverse chi-squared
prior, σ2η ∼ inv.χ2(1). Integrating out ση shows that this is equivalent to having a
Cauchy prior, η ∼ Cauchy. The JZS prior is recommended as a reasonable “objective
prior” to be used in a Bayesian alternative to the common frequentist t-test (Rouder
et al., 2009). We can write the JZS Bayes Factor in terms of the standard t-statistic,
T = (x¯1 − x¯2)/s∗, with n∗ = n1n2/(n1 + n2), as follows:
B01 =
(1 + T
2
n∗−1)
−(n∗/2)∫∞
0
(1 + n∗g)−1/2
(
1 + T
2
(1+n∗g)(n∗−1)
)−(n∗/2)
(2pi)−1/2g−3/2e−1/(2g)dg
(3)
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Figure 6 -left panel shows how the JZS Bayes Factor changes with sample size for
four different values of the observed difference in means, µˆd = x¯1 − x¯2; the observed
variance remains constant at s2p = 1. When the observed mean difference is exactly 0,
the BF increases logarithmically with n. For small to moderate µˆd, the BF supports
the null for small values of n but, as n becomes larger, yields less support for the
null and eventually favours the alternative. The horizontal lines mark the 3:1 and
1/3 thresholds (“moderate evidence”) as well as the 10:1 and 1/10 thresholds (“strong
evidence”).
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Figure 6: Based on Figure 5 from (Rouder et al., 2009). Left (middle; right) panel shows how
the JZS Bayes Factor (the posterior probability of H0; pCET ) changes with sample size
for four different observed mean differences, µˆd = x¯1 − x¯2. The observed variance is
constant, s2p = 1.
Figure 6 -right panel shows pCET -values for the same four values of µˆd, constant
s2p = 1, and the equivalence margin of [−0.50, 0.50]. The lines suggest that CET
possesses similar “ideal behaviour” (Rouder et al., 2009) as is observed with the BF.
When the observed mean difference is exactly zero, CET provides increasing evidence
in favour of equivalence with increasing n. For small to moderate µˆd, CET supports
the null at first and then, as n becomes larger, at a certain point favours the alter-
native. The sharp change-point represents border cases. Consider case “f” in Figure
1: if n increased, the confidence intervals would shrink and at a certain point, the
(1 − α1)% C.I. would be exclude 0 (similar to case “b”). At that point, the result
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abruptly changes from “negative” to “positive”. While this abrupt change may ap-
pear odd at first, it may in fact be more desirable than the smooth transition of the
BF. Consider for example when µˆd = 0.25. Then for n between 112 and 496, the
BF will be strictly above 1/3 and strictly below 3, and as such the result, by BF,
is inconclusive. In contrast, for the same range in sample size, pCET will be either
above 0.90 or below 0.05. As such, with α1 = 0.05 and α2 = 0.10, a conclusive result
is obtained. While careful interpretation is required (e.g. “the effect is significant yet
not of a meaningful magnitude”), this may be preferable in some settings to the BF’s
inconclusive result.
We can also consider the posterior probability ofH0 (i.e. µd = 0) equal to B01/(1+
B01) (when the prior probabilities Pr(H0) and Pr(H1) are equal), plotted in Figure
6 -middle panel. The similarities and differences between p-values and posterior
probabilities have been widely discussed; see Berger & Delampady (1987) and more
recently Greenland & Poole (2013) and Marsman & Wagenmakers (2017). Figure 5
suggests that the JZS-BF and CET testing may often result in similar conclusions.
We investigate this further by means of a simple simulation study.
3.1 Simulation Study
We conducted a small simulation study to compare the operating characteristics of
testing with the JZS-BF relative to with the CET approach. CET conclusions were
based on setting ∆ = 0.50, α1=0.05 and α2=0.10. JZS BF conclusions were based on
a threshold of 3 or greater for evidence in favour of the a negative result and less than
1/3 for evidence in favour of a positive result. BFs in the 1/3 - 3 range correspond
to an inconclusive result. A threshold of 3:1 can be considered “substantial evidence”
(Wagenmakers et al., 2011). Note that one advantage of Bayesian methods, is that
sample sizes need not be determined in advance; see Rouder (2014). Schönbrodt &
Wagenmakers (2016) list three ways one might design sample size for a study using the
BF for testing. For the simulation study here we examine only the “fixed-n design”.
For a range of µd (= 0, 0.07, 0.09, 0.13, 0.18, 0.25, 0.35, 0.48, 0.67) and 14 different
sample sizes (n ranging from 10 to 5,000, with n1 = n2) we simulated normally
distributed two-sample datasets (with σ2 = 1). For each dataset, we obtained CET
p-values, JZS BFs and declared the result to be positive, negative or inconclusive
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accordingly. Results are presented in Figure 7, based on 5,000 distinct simulated
datasets per scenario.
Several findings merit comment:
• In this simulation study, the JZS-BF admits a very low frequentist type I error,
recorded at most ≈ 0.01, for a sample size of n = 110. As the sample size
increases, the frequentist type I error diminishes to a negligible level.
• The JZS-BF requires less data to reach a negative conclusion than the CET.
However, with moderate to large sample sizes (n=100 to 5,000) and small true
mean differences (µd = 0 to 0.25), both methods are approximately equally
likely to deliver a negative conclusion.
• While the JZS-BF requires less data to reach a conclusion when the true mean
difference is small (µd = 0 to 0.25) (see how solid black curve drops more rapidly
than the dashed grey line), there are scenarios in which larger sample sizes will
surprisingly reduce the likelihood of obtaining a conclusive result (see how the
solid black curve drops abruptly then rises slightly as n increases for µd = 0.07,
0.09, 0.13, and 0.18.)
• The JZS-BF is always less likely to deliver a positive conclusion (see how dashed
blue line is always higher than solid blue line). In the scenarios like those consid-
ered, JZS-BF may require larger sample sizes for reaching a positive conclusion
and may be considered “less powerful” in a traditional frequentist sense.
The results of the simulation study suggest that, in many ways, the JZS-BF and
CET operate very similarly. Think of JZS-BF and CET as two pragmatically simi-
lar, yet philosophically different, tools for making “trichotomous significance-testing
decisions”. Both tools will often result in the same outcome, given the same data.
4. A CET publication policy
Many researchers have put forth ideas for new publication policies aimed at addressing
the issue of publication bias. There is a wide range of opinions on how to incorporate
more null results into the published literature. Consider just a few interesting ideas.
In an editorial titled “Journals Should Publish All Null Results and Should Sparingly
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Figure 7: The probability of obtaining each conclusion by Bayesian testing scheme (JZS-BF with
fixed sample size design, BF threshold of 3:1) and CET (α1 = 0.05, α2 = 0.10). Each
panel displays the results of simulations with true mean difference, µd = 0, 0.07, 0.09,
0.13, 0.18, 0.25, 0.35, 0.48, and 0.67.
Publish Positive Results.”, Ioannidis (2006) writes: “Null results should be published
promptly in print in short versions, with more extensive details in web-based files.
Positive results should be published equally promptly, but only on the web, pending
independent replication; once refuted, the original article and the refutation could
be printed as a single nice null report; the rare validated findings should appear in
print with full details.” Another suggestion is that of Shields (2000) who advocates
accepting null papers in a special section of a journal, under the category of “Null
Results in Brief”. The null papers in this section, would provide only a brief summary
of the methods and results of the studies. With regards to power, Shields (2000) states
that: “For the [null] paper to be considered for publication, there must be sufficient
statistical power to test the a-priori hypothesis. For example, the authors should
state the level of power to detect an odds ratio of 2.0 with the current sample size.”
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Dirnagl et al. (2010) makes a similar suggestion with the note that “the quality of
the data submitted to our Negative Results section must meet the same rigorous
standards that our journal applies to all other submissions. In fact, it may be said
that the standards must even exceed those applied currently, as type II error (false
negatives) considerations need to be included.”
Figure 8: The RR publication policy.
Certainly one of the most exciting proposals of late is that of Registered Reports
(RR). RR is one of many proposed “two-step” manuscript review schemes in which
acceptance for publication is granted prior to obtaining the results, see e.g. Walster
& Cleary (1970), Lawlor (2007) as well as more recently Mell & Zietman (2014) and
Smulders (2013). Figure 8 illustrates the RR procedure and Chambers et al. (2014)
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provide an in-depth explanation answering a number of frequently asked questions.
The RR policy has two central components: (1) pre-registration and (2) the “RR
commitment to publish”.
Pre-registration can be extremely beneficial as it reduces “researcher degrees of
freedom” (Simmons et al., 2011) and prevents, to a large degree, many questionable
research practices including data-dredging (Berry, 1990), the post-hoc fabrication
of hypotheses, (“HARKing”) (Kerr, 1998), and p-hacking (Gelman & Loken, 2013).
However, on its own, pre-registration does little to prevent publication bias. This
is simply because pre-registration: (a1) cannot prevent authors from disregarding
negative results (Song et al., 2014); (a2) does nothing to prevent reviewers and editors
from rejecting studies for lack of significance; and (a3) does not guarantee that peer
reviewers consider compliance with the pre-registered analysis plan (van Lent et al.,
2015; Mathieu et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2008).3
Consider the field of medicine as a case study. For over a decade, pre-registration
of clinical trials has been required by major journals as a prerequisite for publication.
Despite this heralded policy change, selective outcome reporting remains ever preva-
lent, (Ramsey & Scoggins, 2008; Mathieu et al., 2009; Ross et al., 2009; Huić et al.,
2011). (This being said, new 2017/2018 guidelines for the clinicaltrial.gov registry
show much promise in addressing a1, a2, and a3; see Zarin et al. (2016).)
In order to prevent publication bias, RR complements pre-registration with a
“commitment to publish”. In practice this consists of an “in principle acceptance”
policy along with the policy of publishing “withdrawn registration" (WR) studies.
In order to counter authors who may simply shelve negative results following pre-
registration (a1), RR journals commit to publishing the abstracts of all withdrawn
studies as WR papers. By guaranteeing that, should a study follow its pre-registered
protocol, it will be accepted for publication (“in principle acceptance”), RR prevents
reviewers and editors from rejecting a study based on the results (a2). Finally, RR
requires that a study is in strict compliance with the pre-registered protocol if it
is to be published (a3). In order to keep a RR journal relevant (not simply full of
inconclusive studies), RR requires, as part of registration, a researcher commit to a
sample size large enough of achieve 90% (in some cases 80%) statistical power. In
3This paragraph based in part on the post from “ff524” at
https://academia.stackexchange.com/questions/74711/why-isnt-pre-registration-required-for-
all-experiments.
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a small number of RR journals, a Bayesian alternative option is offered. Instead of
committing to a specific sample size, researchers commit to achieving a certain BF.
The policy we put forth here is not meant to be an alternative to the “pre-
registration” component of RR. Its benefits are clear, and in our view is most of-
ten “worth the effort” (Wager & Williams, 2013). If implemented properly, pre-
registration should not “stifle exploratory work” (Gelman, 2013b). Instead, what
follows is an alternative to the second “commitment to publish” component.
4.1 Outline of a CET-based publication policy
Figure 9 illustrates the steps of our proposed policy. What follows is a general outline.
Registration- In the first stage of a CET-based policy, before any data are col-
lected, a researcher will register the intent to conduct a study with a journal’s editor.
As in a RR policy, this registration process will detail the motivations and merits
of the study and list the defined outcomes, the various hypotheses to be tested, and
the proposed methods for analysis. Unlike in the RR policy, the registration will not
require a sample size calculation showing a specific level of statistical power. Instead,
the researcher will define an equivalence margin for each hypothesis test to be carried
out. For example if a researcher intends to fit a linear regression model with five
explanatory variables, a margin should be defined for each of the five variables. A
target sample size should be stated, but need not be justified with regards to power
considerations. The researcher will also need to note if there are plans for any sample
size reassessments, interim and/or futility analyses.
Editorial and Peer Review- If the merits of the study satisfy the editorial
board, the registration study plan will then be sent to reviewers to assess whether
the methods for analysis are adequate and whether the equivalence margins are suf-
ficiently narrow. Once the peer reviewers are satisfied (possibly after revisions to
the registration plan), the journal will then agree, in principle, to accept the study
for eventual publication, on condition that either a positive or a negative result is
obtained.
Data collection- Armed with this “in principle acceptance”, the researcher will
then collect data in an effort to meet the established sample size target. Once the data
are collected and analyses complete, the study will be published if and only if either
a positive or negative result is obtained as defined by the pre-specified equivalence
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Figure 9: The CET publication policy.
margins. Inconclusive results will not generally be published thus protecting a jour-
nal from becoming a “dumping ground” for failed studies. In very rare circumstances,
however, it may be determined that an inconclusive study offers a substantial contri-
bution to the field and should therefore be considered for publication. As is required
practice for good reporting, any failure to meet the target sample size should be stated
clearly, along with a discussion of the reasons for failure and the consequences with
regards to the interpretation of results; see Toerien et al. (2009).
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This proposed policy is most similar to the RR Bayesian option outlined in
Section 3. Journals only commit (“in principle acceptance”) to publish conclusive
studies (small p-value/ BF above or below a certain threshold) and no a-priori sam-
ple size requirements are forced upon a researcher. As noted in Section 3, we expect
that the conclusions obtained under either policy will often be the same. The CET-
based policy therefore represents a frequentist alternative to the RR-BF policy.
A journal may wish to require stricter or weaker requirements for publication
of results and this can be done by setting thresholds for α1 and α2 accordingly,
(e.g. stricter thresholds: α1 = 0.01, α2 = 0.05,∆ = 0.5sp; weaker thresholds: α1 =
0.05, α2 = 0.10,∆ = 0.5sp). Also, note that a p-value may be used in one way for the
interpretation of results and another way to inform publication decisions. Recently, a
large number of researchers (Benjamin et al., 2017) have publically suggested that the
threshold for defining “statistical significance” be changed from p < 0.05 to p < 0.005.
However, they are careful to emphasize that while this stricter threshold should change
the description and interpretation of results, it should not change “standards for policy
action nor standards for publication”.
“Gaming the system”- When evaluating a new publication policy one should
always ask how (and how easily) a researcher could -unintentionally or not- “game the
system”. For the CET-policy as described above, we see one rather obvious strategy.
Consider the following, admittedly extreme, example. A researcher submits 20
different study protocols for pre-registration each with very small sample size targets
(e.g. n = 8). Suspend any disbelief, and suppose these studies all have good merit,
are all well written, and are all well designed (besides being severely underpowered),
and are therefore all granted in principle acceptance. Then, in the event that the null
is true (i.e. µ = 0) for all 20 studies (and with α1 = 0.05), it is expected that at least
one study out of the 20 will obtain a positive result and thus be published. This is
publication bias at its worst.
In order to discourage this unfortunate practice, we suggest making a researcher’s
history of pre-registered studies available to the public. The researcher “gaming the
system” in this way will still score his one “type I error” publication, but it will also
be known to the public that in 19 other experiments, research was unsuccessful and
valuable resources were essentially wasted. With digital identifiers such as ORCID
(Haak et al., 2012), it should be straightforward to maintain a track record across
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journals and disciplines of the number of successful and unsuccessful studies for each
researcher/laboratory. However, while potentially beneficial, we do not anticipate this
type of action being necessary. With the CET-policy, it is no longer in a researcher’s
interest to “game the system”.
Consider once again, our extreme example. The strategy has an approximately
64% chance of obtaining at least one publication at a cost of 20 submissions and a
total of 160 = 8 · 20 observations. If the goal is to maximize the probability of being
published (Charlton & Andras, 2006), then it is far more efficient to submit a single
study with n = 160, in which case there is an approximately 98% chance of obtaining
a publication (i.e. with α2 = 0.10, Pr(inconclusive|µ = 0, σ2 = 1,∆ = 0.5) = 0.02;
92% chance with α2 = 0.05, Pr(inconclusive|µ = 0, σ2 = 1,∆ = 0.5) = 0.08).
5. Conclusion
Publication bias has been recognized as a serious problem for several decades now
(Rosenthal, 1979). Yet, in many fields, it is only getting worse (Pautasso, 2010). An
investigation by Kühberger et al. (2014) concludes that the “entire field of psychology”
is now tainted by “pervasive publication bias”.
There remains substantial disagreement on the merits of pre-registration and
result-blind peer-review (see e.g. Coffman & Niederle (2015); de Winter & Happee
(2013); van Assen et al. (2014)). Yet, all can agree that innovative publication policy
prescriptions can be part of the solution to the “reproducibility crisis”. While some
call for dropping p-values and strict thresholds of evidence altogether, we believe that
it is not worthwhile to fight “the temptation to discretize continuous evidence and to
declare victory” (Gelman & Carlin, 2017). Instead, the research community should
embrace this “temptation” and work with it to achieve desirable outcomes. Indeed,
one way to address the “practical difficulties that reviewers face with null results”
(Findley et al., 2016) is to further discretize continuous evidence by means of equiv-
alence testing and we submit that CET can be an effective tool for distinguishing
those “high-quality null results” (Shields et al., 2009) worthwhile of publication.
Recently, a number of influential researchers (McShane et al., 2017) have argued
that to address low reliability, scientists, reviewers and regulators should “abandon
statistical significance”. (Somewhat ironically, in some fields, such as reinforcement
learning, the currently proposed solution is just the opposite: the adoption of “sig-
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nificance metrics and tighter standardization of experimental reporting” (Henderson
et al., 2017).) We recognize that current publication policies, in which evidence is
dichotomized (without any “ontological basis”) may be highly unsatisfactory. How-
ever, one benefit to adopting distinct categories based on clearly defined thresholds
(as in the CET-policy) is that one can assess, in a systematic way, the state of pub-
lished research (in terms of reliability, power, reproducibility, etc.). While using a
“more holistic view of the evidence” to inform publication decisions may (or may
not?) prove effective, ‘meta-research’ under such a paradigm is clearly less feasible.
As such, the question of effectiveness may perhaps never be adequately answered.
Bayesian approaches offer many benefits. However, we see three main drawbacks.
First, adopting Bayesian testing requires a substantial paradigm shift. Since the
interpretation of findings deemed significant by traditional NHST may differ with
Bayes, some will no doubt be reluctant to accept the shift. With CET, the traditional
usage and interpretation of the p-value remains unchanged, except in circumstances
when one fails to reject the null. As such, CET does not change the interpretation of
findings already established as significant. Indeed, CET simply “extend[s] the arsenal
of confirmatory methods rooted in the frequentist paradigm of inference” (Wellek,
2017). Second, as we observed in our simulation study, Bayesian testing is potentially
less powerful than NHST (in the traditional frequentist sense, with a fixed sample size
design) and as such could require substantially larger sample sizes. Finally, we share
the concern of Morey & Rouder (2011) who write that Bayesian testing “provides no
means of assessing whether rejections of the nil [null] are due to trivial or unimportant
effect sizes or are due to more substantial effect sizes.” For these reasons, we believe
CET should be welcomed by any “pragmatic Bayesian” (Kass et al., 2006).
There are many potential areas for further research. Determining whether ∆
and/or α1 and/or α2 should be chosen with consideration of the sample size is impor-
tant and not trivial; related work includes Pérez & Pericchi (2014) who put forward a
“Bayes/non-Bayes compromise” in which the α-level of a confidence interval changes
with n. Issues which have proven problematic for standard equivalence testing must
also be addressed for CET. These include multiplicity control (Lauzon & Caffo, 2009)
and potential problems with interpretation (Aberegg et al., 2017). It would also be
worthwhile considering whether CET is appropriate for testing for baseline balance,
Senn (1994). Finally, the impact of a CET policy on meta-analysis should be exam-
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ined, Hedges (1992) (i.e. how should one account for the exclusion of inconclusive
results in the published literature when deriving estimates in a meta-analysis?).
The publication policy outlined here should be welcomed by journal editors, re-
searchers and all those who wish to see more reliable science. Research journals which
wish to remain relevant and gain a high impact factor should welcome the CET-policy
as it offers a mechanism for excluding inconclusive results while providing a space for
potentially impactful negative studies. Embracing equivalence testing is an effective
way to make publishing null results “more attractive” (O’Hara, 2011). Researchers
should be pleased with a policy that provides “in principle acceptance” and does not
insist on specific sample size requirements that may not be feasible or desirable.
The requirement to specify an equivalence margin prior to collecting data will
have the additional benefit of forcing researchers and reviewers to think about what
would represent a meaningful effect size before embarking on a given study. While
there will no doubt be pressure on researchers to “p-hack” in order to meet either the
the α1 or α2 threshold, this can be discouraged by insisting that an analysis strictly
follows the pre-registered analysis plan. Adopting strict thresholds for significance
can also act as a deterrent. Finally, we believe that the CET-policy will improve the
reliability of published science by not only allowing for more negative research to be
published, but by modifying the incentive structure driving research (Nosek et al.,
2012).
Using an optimality model, Higginson & Munafò (2016) conclude that, given cur-
rent incentives, the rational strategy of a scientist is to “focus almost all of their
research effort on underpowered exploratory work [... and] carry out lots of under-
powered small studies to maximize their number of publications, even though this
means around half will be false positives.” This result is in line with the views of
many (e.g. Bakker et al. (2012), Button et al. (2013) and Gervais et al. (2015)),
and provides the basis for why statistical power in many fields has not improved
(Smaldino & McElreath, 2016) despite being highlighted as an issue over six decades
ago (Cohen, 1962). A CET-based policy may provide the incentive scientists need to
pursue higher statistical power. If CET can change the incentives driving research,
the reliability of science will be further improved. More research on this question (i.e.
“meta-research”) is needed.
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